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I:: THE St'PREME COCRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
·~~-'-.NADA, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
VS. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
GEORGE TANNFR and IDA 
1A'.\clEP HAMBLIN, 
and 
Defendants and 
Appellants, 
STANLEY H. WALKER, Utah 
County Treasurer, 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court No. 19247 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit by an alleged assignee of a right of 
redemption of real estate from a sheriff's sale against the 
assignees of the certificate of sale for a judgment determining 
t~at the plaintiff had rightfully redeemed the land. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for an 
amended summary judgment seeking a judgment directing the defend-
ants to execute and deliver to the plaintiff a good and proper 
certificate of redemption and directing the defendants to 
accept as consideration therefor the sum of $84,366.00 t!1ere 
tofore paid to the clerk of the district court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants and appellants seek the reversal of 
the amended summary judgment and remand of the case for an 
evidentiary trial on the merits. 
STATEI'ENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and respondent will be referred to in 
this brief as the "plaintiff" and the defendants, George Tanner 
and Ida Tanner Hamblin, will be referred to as the "defendants". 
This suit involves a parcel of land in Utah County 
which was sold on May 26, 1981, at sheriff's sale pursuant to a 
decree of the district court entered in the case of First Securit· 
Mortgage Company v. American Tierra Corporation, et al, (R. 3, 4) 
On June 4, 1981, the First Security Mortgage Company, the pur-
chaser of the land at the sheriff's sale, assigned to the defend-
ants the certificate of sale. (R. 8, 9). On September 11, 1981, 
one Charles Moore, d/b/a/ Township Square, grantor, by warranty 
deed, conveyed the above mentioned land and other land to Grana~ 
Inc., grantee, subject to taxes and certain trust deeds, specifi-
cally described. (R. 10, 11). 
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There is attached to the complaint a document entitled 
'~signment of Right of Redemption", which is undated, but 
1cknowledged on November 24, 1981, assigning and transferring 
the right of redemption from Charles Moore, d/b/a Township 
Square and American Tierra Corporation. (R. 12 - 14). 
It is alleged in the complaint that the transfers 
and assignments mentioned above had been made. It is then 
alleged: 
"6. Iimnediately preceding the sheriff's 
sale and at all times material hereto, either 
Charles Moore, d/b/a Township Square or Ameri-
can Tierra Corporation ("American Tierra") was 
the owner of the Subject Property. Immediately 
following the sale either Charles Moore d/b/a 
To~~ship Square or American Tierra was the owner 
of the right of redemption existing in connec-
tion with the Subject Property." (R. 4) 
It is further alleged that on or about November 17, 
1981, an agent of the plaintiff contacted an attorney whom was 
known to have represented the defendants and that the attorney 
said he would contact the defendants to find out what amount 
would be required to redeem. The attorney refused to inform 
the plaintiff as to the amount, but indicated the defendants 
" .... intended to get the property back." (R. 5) 
It is further alleged that on or about November 23, 
1981, plaintiff, through its attorney, contacted Lieutenant 
Yeith Bills of the Utah County Sheriff's Department and informed 
him that the plaintiff as successor to American Tierra was ready 
to redeem, that Tanner and Hamblin were disputing the right of 
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the plaintiff to redeem, and that they would not inform the 
plaintiff of the amount required to redeem. It is t~1en alle,.L 
that Bills instructed plaintiff to pay the amount bid together 
with six percent to the Utah County Clerk and that this payment 
was made. (R. 5 , 6) . 
A second cause of action alleges that " .... economic 
injury" has and is being suffered by plaintiff as a result of 
the actions of Tanner and Hamblin .... " (R. 6) 
The defendants answered the complaint, denying the 
allegations as to certain contacts with the defendants' alleged 
attorney, and denied for lack of information the allegations 
regarding contacts with Lieutenant Bills of the Sheriff's office. 
(R. 20, 21). 
The plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judg-
ment seeking an order directing the defendants to execute and 
deliver to the plaintiff a certificate of redemption and to 
accept from the Utah County Treasurer the funds which had been 
paid to the County Clerk. It is stated in the motion that the 
pleadings, exhibits, and affidavits show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact. (R. 22, 23). 
A memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment 
was filed to which was attached copies of the documents of 
transfer, a copy of the judgment of foreclosure (R. 31 - 34), ar. 
affidavit of Lieutenant Keith Bills (R. 39, 40), and affidavits 
of David K. Broadbent. (R. 44, 45, 46 - 48). 
-4-
The defendants responded to the motion alleging that 
; ayment was tendered as required by Rule 69 (f) (2), Utah 
,rs of Civil Procedure, that payment to the County Clerk is 
etrinitted only if there is a disagreement as to whether any 
sum demanded for redemption is reasonable and proper, and that 
the~e was no disagreement, and that material issues of fact are 
raised by the affidavits of Lieutenant Bills, Mr. Tanner and 
~rs. Hamblin. (R. 53 - 58) 
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and 
made and entered a formal partial summary judgment which orders, 
adjudges, and decrees: 
(1) that the plaintiff has taken all steps to redeem 
the property described in the complaint; 
(2) that the defendants forthwith execute and deliver 
to the plaintiff a certificate of redemption; 
(3) that the county clerk turn over the funds on 
de?osit to the defendants; 
(4) that if the defendants should fail, neglect, or 
refuse to deliver the certificate of redemption " .... that this 
judgment shall stand and be a good sufficient, and complete con-
veyance and certificate of redemption from the defendants Tanner 
and Hamblin to the plaintiff .... "; 
(5) that the title of the plaintiff against the 
'~fendants is quieted; 
(6) that matters raised by the pleadings and not here 
adjudicated are reserved for further proceedings. 
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An appeal was taken from the partial summary judgment 
(Supreme Court No. 18906) It was dismissed on the ground that 
the order appealed from was not a final judgment, citing Rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
After the case was remanded, the parties stipulated 
that an order might be made by the district court dismissing the 
second cause of action for damages. An amended summary judgment 
was made and entered in the same form as the partial summary judg-
ment, referred to above, except that it states that the second 
cause of action (damages) is dismissed without prejudice. There 
is, therefore, no issue in the case as to the finality of the 
judgment. 
68, 69). 
(R. 61 - 65) 
This appeal is from the amended summary judgment. (R. 
POINT I. 
THERE ARE GENVINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS 
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS AND AFFIDAVITS 
The allegations of the complaint and answer are stated 
above under "Statement of Facts". It will be noted that in para-
graph 6 of the complaint, quoted above on page 3, it is alleged 
that " .... either Charles Moore d/b/a Township Square or American 
Tierra Corporation ("American Tierra") was the owner of the sub-
ject property .... " innnediately preceding the sheriff's sale and 
" .... at all times material hereto." It is further alleged in the 
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,,~,cc paragraph that either one or the other was the owner of 
1 right of redemption. (R. 4) 
The allegations of paragraph 6 are denied by para-
graph 2 of the defendants' answer. This raises a genuine issue 
of fact as to the ownership of the land and the right of redemp-
tion. (R. 20) 
The other genuine issues of material fact relate to 
the attempted redemption of the land by the plaintiff. 
Rule 69(f) (2), which relates to the method of redemp-
tion, provides: 
"Redemption--How Made. At the time of 
redemption the person seeking the same may make 
payment of the amount required to the person 
from whom the property is being redeemed, or 
for him to the officer who made the sale, or his 
successor in office. At the same time the redemp-
tioner must produce to the officer or person from 
whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his notice 
to the officer: (1) a certified copy of the docket 
of the judgment under which he claims the right to 
redeem, or, if he redeems upon a mortgage or other 
lien, a memorandum of the record thereof certified 
by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly 
acknowledged or proved where the same is necessary 
to establish his claim; (3) an affidavit by himself 
or his agent showing the amount then actually due 
on the lien." 
As stated in the affidavits of Ida T. Hamblin and 
George Tanner, no payment of the amount required for the redemp-
tion of the land, namely $84,366.00, was made to them or to 
either of them, on or before the expiration date of the redemp-
Lion period or at all, and no money in any amount was tendered. 
(R. 55 - 58). In fact there was no direct communication, written 
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or oral, between a Granada representative and either George 
Tanner or Ida Hamblin before the expiration of the redemption 
period. 
No payment or tender was made to the officer who made 
the sale or his successor as required by the rule quoted above. 
The affidavit of Lieutenant Keith Bills, attached to the Motion 
for Surnrnary Judgment, states that he had a telephone conversa-
tion with David K. Broadbent, attorney for Granada, in which 
Mr. Broadbent indicated that Granada, Inc., was ready to redeem 
the property sold by affiant at sheriff's sale, and that Mr. 
Broadbent had asked the Attorney for George Tanner and Ida T. 
Hamblin which amount would be required for redemption of the 
property. 
It is stated: 
"Mr. Broadbent also informed Affiant that 
Tanner and Hamblin refused to give an amount 
and in fact disputed the right of Granada, Inc., 
to redeem the property." 
It is further stated in the Affidavit: 
"Affiant responded that he had heard that 
Tanner and Hamblin were trying to obtain interest 
in addition to the amount provided in Rule 69(f), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that in any 
event since the amount was not agreed upon he 
would be unable to accept the funds tendered. 
Affiant informed Mr. Broadbent that he should 
deposit the amount of eighty-four-thousand-three-
hundred-sixty-six dollars ($84, 165. QI)) (the amount 
paid by the purchaser at sale plus 6%) with the 
Utah County Clerk, since that is the procedure 
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when 
there is a dispute regarding redemption." (R. 39, 
40). 
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The Affidavits of George Tanner and Ida T. Hamblin 
j[~ specifically that at no time before the expiration of 
!,c period of red empt ion did Mr. Broadbent contact them person-
ally or by telephone regarding the amount of money required for 
redemption and that they had never refused to "give an amount". 
The affidavits also state that they had never told Lieutenant 
Bills or anyone else in the sheriff's office that they disputed 
the amount required for redemption or that they disputed the 
right of Granada, Inc., to redeem. (R. 55 - 58) 
The second paragraph of Rule 69 (£) (3) provides: 
"In the event there is a disagreement as to 
whether any sum demanded for redemption is reason-
able or proper, the person seeking redemption may 
pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the 
amount in dispute, to the court out of which execu-
tion or order authorizing the sale was issued, and 
at the same time file with the court a petition 
setting forth the item or items demanded to which 
he objects, together with his grounds of objection; 
and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing 
a time for hearing of such objections. A copy of 
the petition and order fixing time for hearing shall 
be served on the purchaser not less than two days 
before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the 
objections the court shall enter an order determining 
the amount required for redemption. In the event 
an additional amount to that theretofore paid to the 
clerk is required, the person seeking redemption 
shall pay to the clerk such additional amount with-
in 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute 
and deliver a proper certificate of redemption upon 
being paid the amount required by the court for re-
demption." 
As indicated in Rule 69 (£) (3) (second paragraph), the 
only right of a redemptioner to pay money to the court is'' ..... 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded 
for redemption is reasonable or proper .... " (Emphasis added.) 
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A reading of the affidavit of Lieutenant Bills and 
the entire record does not disclose any disagreement as to 
whether the sum demanded was reasonable and proper. That affi-
davit only sa~s that Mr. Broadbent said that Tanner and Hamblin 
(1) refused to give an amount and (2) disputed the right of 
Granada to redeem. (R. 39, 40) 
There is clearly an issue of fact as to whether there 
was any disagreement as to the amount required for redemption. 
This is obviously a material issue because the rule requires a 
disagreement before money can be paid to the court. 
A right of redemption from a judicial sale is a statu-
tory right, the nature of which was considered by the Supreme 
Court of Utah in the case of Mollerup vs Storage Systems Inter-
national, 569 P.2d 1122. It is stated: 
following: 
"The right of redemption is not an equitable 
right created or regulated by principles of equity 
but rather is a creature of statute and depends 
entirely on the provisions of the statute creating 
the right. U.C.A. 1953, 78-37-6." 
In footnote No. 3 on page 1124, the Court cites the 
"SO C.J.S. Judicial Sales Sec. 37c; Colvin v. 
Weigold, 31 Ariz. 370, 253 P. 633; State ex rel. 
Anderson v. Kerr, 51 Minn. 417, 53 N.W. 719; State 
v. O'Connor, 6 N.D. 285, 69 N.W. 692." 
A case closely in point, which involved a tender of 
the redemption money to the clerk of the court as in this case 
was decided by the Supreme Court of New Mexico, Moise v. Ti!Illil, 
262 P. 535. It is stated in the opinion: 
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"It seems clear that under this statute the 
redemption payment is to be made to the purchaser 
or his assign, and that, unless we are to enlarge 
the right by construction, a tender made to the 
clerk of the court is ineffectual. 
"'As a general rule we agree that a statutory 
right of redemption is to be favorably regarded, 
but, it is statutory right that is not to be en-
larged by judicial interpretation. We cannot ex-
tend the time allowed for redemption nor waive any 
condition attached to the statute.'" Mining Co. v. 
Mining Co., 18 N.M. 153, 135 P. 78. 
"So it seems that the trial court erred in 
basing judgrnent upon payment or tender to the 
clerk." 
In surmnary, the affidavits in support of the motion 
for partial summary judgment, and the affidavits of Mr. Tanner 
and ~rs. Hamblin in opposition thereto, definitely show that no 
tender or payment of any money was made to either the" .... person 
from whom the property is being redeemed or for him to the officer 
who made the sale .... " as required by Rule 69(£) (2). The affi-
davits in opposition show conclusively that there was no contact 
with the assignees of the certificate of sale by any representa-
tive of Granada and there is nothing in the record to show any 
disagreement as to the amount required for redemption. 
The law in this State is clear that" .... the right of 
redemption must be exercised in strict accord with statutory 
terms .... ". It was not so exercised and the motion for amended 
summary judgment should have been denied. Mollerup v. Storage 
S~stems International, supra. 
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There is a good reason whv the rule requires a dis-
agreement as to the sum demanded before permittinf' the pa:cien'. 
of the redemption money to the clerk. 
The defendants were not parties to the case in which 
the judgment was entered and the sheriff's sale was held. They 
were not already in court. The payment of money to the clerk 
resulted in plunging them into litigation which obviously would 
not have been necessary if Granada had paid the amount of money, 
$84,366.00, to them. This sum could have been computed by 
simple arithmetic in accordance with Rule 69 (f) (3), of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If, after a tender, there was 
a dispute, the money could have been paid to the clerk. 
If this amended surrnnary judgment is affirmed, the 
provisions of Rule 69 (f) (2) as to payment and tender can, in alJ 
cases, be ignored and payment made to the clerk. 
POINT II. 
THE AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 56 
OF THE RL'LES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56(c) provides in pertinent part: 
" .... the judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if anv, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any~material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of la\.:." 
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The issi_;es raised b:,' the affidavits of Lieutenant 
Bills ar.~ the defendants are discussed under the previous 
cJJing and will not be repeated here, However, the defendants 
:ontend that the Lieutenant Keith Bills' affidavit does not 
meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) which provides: 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is co~peten~ to testify to the matters stated 
therein, ... 
It will be noted that Bills' affidavit, quoted, in 
?art, on page 8 of this brief is not made on personal knowledge, 
:>ut is hearsay, and no pertinent part of it would be admissible 
in evidence. He gave legal advice to Broadbent based on what 
he had heard. (R. 39, 40). 
The other affidavit in support of the plaintiff's 
motion for partial summary judgment, which was made by David K. 
Broadbent, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff, states that 
affiant contacted Bills and told him that plaintiff was prepared 
to redeem the property by paying the sum of $84,366.00, and that 
Bills told him that such tender and payment would not be accepted 
!:>ecause of an apparent dispute as to the amount. (R. 44, 45) 
The pertinent part of this affidavit is hearsay and 
~0 ~~d not be admissible. Broadbent's affidavit does not show 
c1,ntact with either defendant for the purpose either of inquiring 
as to the amount due or paying or tendering payment. (R. 44, 45). 
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The following cases hold that an affidavit consisti• 
of hearsay statements is insufficient: 
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 
274, 508 P.2d 538. 
Western States Thrift and Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 
29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019. 
The affidavits of George Tanner and Ida T. Hamblin, 
which are uncontradicted, state that neither of them was con-
tacted by any representative of plaintiff about the redemption, 
neither had refused to "give" Broadbent the amount required for 
redemption, and neither had told him the amount was disputed. 
It is further stated that neither had had any conversation with 
Lieutenant Bills and did not tell Lieutenant Bills or any other 
person that they were trying to get additional interest. (R. 
55 - 58). 
An affidavit was made by Lawson 0. Hamblin to the 
effect that in the afternoon of November 27, 1981, (the last 
day for redemption), he talked to Lieutenant Bills in person, 
at the Sheriff's office, and inquired as to whether any money hac 
been paid to redeem the land and was told, "No one has tendered 
any money to me nor to this office to redeem that property." He 
said further that an of fer to pay the money would have to be made 
by "12 :00 midnight today". (R. 59, 60) 
The requirements of Rule 56(e), quoted above, have not 
been met and there is nothing in the record to support the judg-
ment that a redemption was made. 
Holbrook Companv v. Adams, (Utah) 542 P. 2d 191. 
Hatch v. Su~arhouse Finance Co., 20 Utah 2d 156, 
434 P.2d 75 . 
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POI:\'~ III 
A PART Oc :HE A'.E~lDEJ Sl~'.1-:ARY JL'DGMENT IS VOID 
FOR WAXT OF Jl'RISDICTION AND OTHER PARTS ARE VOID 
''=P THE RE..;so:; THAT Jl'RISDICTION WAS NOT PROPERLY INVOKED 
The part of the summary judgment which directs the 
c~~n~v clerk to pay the money on deposit to the defendants is 
·.·oid for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Clerk. The 
co'.mt·: treasurer was named as a defendant, but the county clerk 
;:as not so named. No process was served on the county clerk. 
There is no jurisdiction over the person and the judgment against 
the clerk is void. 
Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co. , 99 Utah 158, 
10JP.2d 134. 
The defendants' second point under this heading is 
that the part of the judgment declaring that the judgment shall 
constitute a certificate of redemption and the part of the judg-
ment quieting plaintiff's title against the defendants are void 
because the jurisdiction of the court was not properly invoked. 
In the case of Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha 
.. Bragg, 67 Utah 60, 245 P. 966, 973, it was held: 
"It is fundamental that a petition or pleading 
of some kind is the juridical means of investing a 
court with jurisdiction of subject matter to adjudi-
cate it." 
In this court's opinion in the case of Upper Blue Bench 
lrr. Dist. v. Continental Bank and Trust Co., 93 Utah 325, 72 P. 
2; 1048, the follov.'ing is quoted from 1 Freeman on Judgments, 
Section 388: 
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" .... Mere possession of power to act in res1•ect 
to a specific subject matter is of nn consrquen~• 
unless the power is properl:: invovC>cl." 
See also Hampshire v. Woolev, 72 Vtah 106, 269 P. 11~ 
In this case, the onlv allegation in the complaint o~ 
ownership of the land and the right of redemption is in paragrap~ 
6, quoted above on page 3. It will be noted that it is in the 
alternative and is that either Moore or American Tierra own the 
land and redemption right. Apparently the plaintiff did not kno~ 
who the owner was when the pleading was drafted. This allegation 
did not invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. There is 
no pleading to support a judgment quieting the plaintiff's title 
CONCLUSION 
The amended sunmiary judgment should be reversed for the 
several reasons set out above and the case should be remanded for 
an evidentiary trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCART"' 
By: 
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